Profit growth outpaced revenue growth in FY2024: net income rose to $3.78B, an increase of +14.19% versus FY2023 (3.78 - 3.31)/3.31 = +0.1419 — indicating modest operating gearing on incremental revenue. Nevertheless, the margin story is mixed: while profitability metrics remained broadly stable, free cash flow and operating cash flow contracted. Operating cash flow declined to $4.11B in FY2024 from $4.71B in FY2023, a drop of -12.74%, and free cash flow fell to $3.20B from $3.81B, a -15.99% decline. The divergence between reported earnings and cash flow underscores working-capital dynamics and timing of investments and government billings that are intrinsic to large shipbuilding programs.

Calculated financial ratios and balance-sheet stance#

Inspecting year-end balance-sheet figures shows GD ended FY2024 with total assets of $55.88B and total stockholders’ equity of $22.06B. The company reported total debt of $10.68B and net debt of $8.98B (total debt less cash & equivalents of $1.70B). Using the FY2024 balance-sheet items, the simple net-debt-to-equity ratio is 0.41x (8.98 / 22.06 = 0.4074) and total-debt-to-equity is 0.48x (10.68 / 22.06 = 0.4843). On an EBITDA basis, net debt converts to ~1.54x net-debt-to-EBITDA (8.98 / 5.82 = 1.54), using FY2024 EBITDA of $5.82B. The current ratio stands at 1.37x (total current assets 24.39 / total current liabilities 17.82), validating near-term liquidity coverage for working-capital needs.

Those calculated leverage measures place GD in a conservative financial posture relative to its capital-intensive peers: net leverage under 2x EBITDA provides financial flexibility for dividend payments, modest buybacks and continued capital spending for shipyards and production lines. It is important to note small discrepancies between my balance-sheet calculations and some TTM metrics reported elsewhere; those differences are consistent with the use of trailing twelve-month averages or market-date snapshots and do not change the underlying conclusion that leverage remains moderate.

Income statement history (table)#

Year	Revenue (USD)	Gross Profit (USD)	Operating Income (USD)	Net Income (USD)	Gross Margin	Operating Margin	Net Margin
2024	$47.72B	$7.36B	$4.80B	$3.78B	15.43%	10.05%	7.93%
2023	$42.27B	$6.67B	$4.25B	$3.31B	15.78%	10.04%	7.84%
2022	$39.41B	$6.62B	$4.21B	$3.39B	16.80%	10.69%	8.60%
2021	$38.47B	$6.41B	$4.16B	$3.26B	16.66%	10.82%	8.47%

This table compresses the last four fiscal years and shows the consistent top-line expansion from 2021 to 2024 and a gradual compression in gross and net margins from the 2022 peaks — a pattern consistent with mix shifts, cost absorption and program-stage effects in large shipbuilding work and services.

Balance sheet and cash-flow summary (table)#

Year	Cash & Equivalents	Total Assets	Total Liabilities	Total Equity	Total Debt	Net Debt	Operating Cash Flow	Free Cash Flow	CapEx
2024	$1.70B	$55.88B	$33.82B	$22.06B	$10.68B	$8.98B	$4.11B	$3.20B	$0.92B
2023	$1.91B	$54.81B	$33.51B	$21.30B	$11.08B	$9.17B	$4.71B	$3.81B	$0.90B
2022	$1.24B	$51.59B	$33.02B	$18.57B	$12.11B	$10.87B	$4.58B	$3.46B	$1.11B
2021	$1.60B	$50.07B	$32.43B	$17.64B	$13.18B	$11.57B	$4.27B	$3.38B	$0.89B

The balance-sheet table highlights steady asset growth and a gradual decline in net debt since the 2021 peak. Free cash flow has remained material (multi-billion dollars annually), but the FY2024 decline in both operating cash flow and FCF is noteworthy and deserves scrutiny relative to working-capital timing in shipbuilding and large program billings.

Backlog dynamics and strategic implications — what $103.7B means#

The reported $103.7B shipbuilding backlog is the single largest strategic datum that reshapes the investment case for GD: it converts near-term uncertainty into multi-year revenue visibility concentrated in high-value Navy programs. That backlog is anchored in three program pillars: Virginia‑class submarines, Columbia‑class development and production, and DDG‑51 Arleigh Burke destroyer work. Public reporting and industry outlets have highlighted a steady cadence of awards and option exercises in 2025 that materially inflated shipbuilding backlogs, with Virginia-class contracts, a $322.6M Electric Boat engineering award and additional DDG‑51 option-driven contracts cited in reporting around mid‑2025 Seeking Alpha Investing.com Naval-Technology.

This backlog magnifies revenue visibility in ways that matter for capital planning and capacity utilization. Submarine programs — particularly Columbia-class — are multi-decade undertakings with embedded engineering, long-lead procurement and sustainment revenue streams. The company’s backlog therefore functions like a long-duration revenue floor for shipbuilding-related capital deployment and workforce planning. That predictability is valuable because specialized shipbuilding capacity cannot be scaled up rapidly, implying incumbency advantage for GD and its yards.

Yet backlog visibility is not a margin guarantee. Shipbuilding contracts vary across fixed-price and cost-plus constructs, and margin realization depends on execution, labor productivity, supply-chain inflation and government-directed change orders. The fiscal reality in FY2024 — stable margins but weaker cash conversion — implies that execution and working-capital timing will determine whether backlog visibility translates into sustained margin expansion or merely top-line stability.

Program-level catalysts and evidence from contract awards#

Media and contracting feeds from mid-2025 point to specific contract actions that feed the backlog narrative. Industry outlets reported multiple Virginia-class sub awards and modifications (including a roughly $987M Virginia-class production support modification and a July 2025 component award near $1.85B in press summaries) and an Electric Boat $322.6M engineering contract referenced in several outlets ArmyRecognition Investing.com. Surface combatant work also expanded through an additional DDG‑51 hull added to a multi-year buy, which industry sites reported in early August 2025 Naval-Technology.

Taken together, these program-level awards drive two structural effects. First, they push forward funded content into the near-to-medium term, improving bill-of-materials planning and capacity utilization. Second, they increase the company’s exposure to higher-complexity work (Columbia development, Virginia production) that has significant engineering intensity and potential for both cost overruns and higher long-term margins if learning curves and industrial investments pay off.

Cash flow quality and capital allocation tensions#

The company remains a substantial cash generator in absolute terms, but FY2024’s decline in operating cash flow and FCF requires attention. Free cash flow conversion versus net income in FY2024 is approximately 84.66% (3.20 / 3.78 = 0.8466), which is healthy on a conversion basis, but the year-over-year decline in absolute FCF (-15.99%) constrains discretionary capital deployment. In FY2024 GD paid dividends of $1.53B and repurchased roughly $1.50B of common stock, while net cash used in financing activities totaled -$3.37B, reflecting a consistent shareholder-return posture.

Capital expenditure remained moderate at $916MM in FY2024, largely directed at sustaining shipyard capacity and equipment. Given the capital intensity and long lead times of submarine and destroyer builds, GD’s balance sheet conservatism (net-debt-to-EBITDA ~1.54x) preserves runway for continued dividends and targeted buybacks while retaining room for working-capital swings tied to large program billings.

Competitive positioning and industry context#

General Dynamics occupies a defensive-industrial niche with highly concentrated capabilities in undersea production (Electric Boat) and surface combatant construction (Bath Iron Works for DDG-51). Those capabilities are difficult to replicate quickly because of specialized workforce requirements, long lead-times for infrastructure, and regulatory/governmental relationships. Against peers such as Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), GD’s mix tilts more toward undersea strategic programs (Columbia, Virginia) whereas HII retains a broader profile across amphibious and auxiliary surface ships. This structural differentiation matters because undersea programs carry higher barriers to entry and, if executed well, can sustain higher margin durability over long contract cycles. However, the company is not immune to industry-wide stresses: labor availability, collective bargaining outcomes, and supply-chain inflation are common risks that can compress margins across builders.

Historical pattern and management execution#

Over the four-year window to FY2024, GD has demonstrated consistent revenue growth and stable operating margins, but the interplay between backlog expansion and cash generation has varied. Historically the company has prioritized a balanced capital-return approach: meaningful dividends (TTM dividend per share of $5.84) combined with opportunistic buybacks. Management’s track record of converting backlog into deliverable programs and steady earnings is supportive of the credibility around long backlog visibility. The key execution metric to monitor going forward is the pace at which backlog-funded production converts into cash receipts and margin recovery, particularly within the high-complexity Columbia and Virginia programs.

What this means for investors#

General Dynamics now presents a two-part story. On one axis is structural revenue visibility supported by a record $103.7B shipbuilding backlog and multiple multi-year, high-value Navy programs that underpin production planning for the rest of the decade. On the other axis is near-term cash-flow volatility and margin sensitivity tied to program execution and working-capital timing. The presence of a large, funded backlog materially reduces top-line demand risk, but it does not eliminate execution risk — which will be the primary determinant of margin expansion and the timing of free cash flow normalization.

Investors should therefore track three high-signal metrics in incoming reports: (1) quarterly conversion of backlog into billed revenue and billings-to-cash timing; (2) Marine Systems program-level margins and any disclosed cost-to-complete metrics on major submarine blocks; and (3) working-capital trends and the cadence of government change orders and modifications that affect cash receipts. Positive progress on those fronts would convert backlog visibility into demonstrable cash and margin outcomes; adverse performance would leave top-line visibility intact but compress returns on invested capital.

Key takeaways#

General Dynamics has achieved a strategic milestone with ~$103.7B in shipbuilding backlog, translating into unusually long revenue visibility for a major defense contractor. The FY2024 financials show revenue of $47.72B, net income of $3.78B, and FCF of $3.20B, with leverage at a moderate level (net debt ~$8.98B, net-debt/EBITDA ~1.54x). The immediate operational question is execution: can GD convert its backlog into expanding margins and stabilized cash flows as major submarine and destroyer programs move through intensive production phases? If so, the company’s incumbency in specialized shipbuilding assets becomes a durable source of returns; if not, backlog alone will not shield the company from margin compression associated with labor or supply disruptions.

Conclusion#

General Dynamics sits at a strategic inflection where exceptional backlog visibility coexists with transitory cash-flow softness. The record $103.7B shipbuilding backlog materially reduces top-line uncertainty and favours long-run capacity utilization and planning, but the FY2024 fall in operating cash flow and free cash flow focuses attention on execution, working-capital management and program margins. For stakeholders, the most relevant near-term evidence will come from program-level margin disclosures and quarterly cash conversion metrics that show whether backlog converts into predictable, margin-accretive cash flows. Absent clear execution improvement, the value of the backlog remains a forward-looking asset rather than an immediate margin-transforming engine.

(Selected reporting on contract awards and backlog expansion: Seeking Alpha — Q2 coverage; Electric Boat engineering award coverage: Investing.com; DDG‑51 multi‑year option reporting: Naval-Technology.)